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Abstract 
Has Latin America’s left turn mattered in media politics? Does ideology impact governments’ 
practices and policies regarding media and journalistic institutions? Through an empirical 
assessment of discourses on the media, of direct-communication practices, and of media 
regulation policies on the part of the recent leftist governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela, this paper stresses the existence of a specific media 
activism on the part of leftist governments in Latin America. While showing that the current 
binary distinctions that stress the existence of two lefts—“populist” and “nonpopulist”—
obscure important commonalities and continuities, the author also demonstrates that it is the 
existence of certain institutional and structural constraints that best accounts for the differ-
ences among the various leftist governments in Latin America. In sum, the paper challenges 
the prevailing neglect of ideology as a relevant factor in explaining developments in gov-
ernment–media relationships in the region. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Der mediale Aktivismus der lateinamerikanischen Linksregierungen:  
Hat Ideologie einen Einfluss? 
Hat sich Lateinamerikas Linksruck auf die Medienpolitik ausgewirkt? Hat Ideologie auf die 
Politik und Einstellung der Regierungen gegenüber Medien und Presse einen Einfluss? 
Durch eine empirische Feststellung von öffentlichen Regierungsmediendiskursen, direkten 
Kommunikationsvorrichtungen und Medienregulierungspolitik in den jüngsten linksorien-
tierten Regierungen in Argentinien, Bolivien, Brasilien, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay und Vene-
zuela, hebt diese Arbeit die Existenz eines spezifischen Medienaktivismus der regionalen 
Linksregierungen hervor. Während gezeigt wird, dass binarische Unterscheidungen zwi-
schen einer „populistischen“ und einer „nichtpopulistischen“ Linken wichtige Gemeinsam-
keiten und Kontinuitäten verdunkeln, belegt die Arbeit, dass, jenseits der Gemeinsamkeiten, 
das Vorhandensein gewisser Zwangskontexte die Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen 
linken Regierungserfahrungen in Lateinamerika besser erklärt. Diese Arbeit stellt somit die 
herrschende Vernachlässigung von Ideologie als relevantem Faktor für die Erklärung der re-
gionalen Verhältnisse zwischen Regierungen und Medien in Frage. 
The Media Activism of  
Latin America’s Leftist Governments:  
Does Ideology Matter? 
Philip Kitzberger 
Article 
1. Introduction 
2. Assessing and Explaining Media Activism on the Part of Leftist Latin American 
Governments 
3. The Country Experiences 
4. Conclusion: The Media Activism of Latin America’s Leftist Governments in Context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years Latin America has witnessed a wave of leftist governments. In spite of their 
common self-identification as part of a new regional left and their egalitarian claims of social 
justice and political inclusion, these governments differ in terms of leadership, mobilization, 
and policy orientation. Among the most noteworthy features of these new political experi-
ences has been the rise in news media–government conflict and oppositional polarization. 
These “media wars” have been fought openly in front of the public. But rather than the gov-
ernments’ leftist orientation, the cause has predominantly been said to be the populist or au-
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thoritarian character of the heads of government—Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, Néstor 
Kirchner or Rafael Correa—which is seen as inimical to Western standards of press freedom. 
Though the two leaders are not that radical, the rapport between Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva 
and Tabaré Vázquez, both of whose governments are viewed as “moderate” or “nonpopu-
list” leftist, and the media institutions in their respective countries has also been uneasy. 
Nevertheless, their governments’ conflicts with the media—in contrast to those of the for-
merly mentioned leaders—been deemed “normal” and within liberal-democratic parameters 
(Petkoff 2005, Castañeda 2006).1 
In fact, little attention has been paid to ideology as a factor which might account for re-
cent changes in media–government relations in the region and overall.2 Ideological identities 
aside, the growing confrontation between governments and the media, in Latin America and 
elsewhere, has been seen as part of a trend of increasing media proactivity on the part of 
governments’ executive branches. This proactivity has been seen as a response to the chal-
lenge of a political field colonized by an autonomous and powerful media logic (Gaber 2000, 
Negrine 2007, Helms 2008). 
Should the indifference to ideology be reconsidered given the recent re-politicization 
brought about by Latin America’s left turn? Does this left turn matter in media politics? More 
specifically, do the attitudes of the so-called “populist” leftists (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia 
and Argentina) towards media and journalism have something in common with other “mod-
ern” leftist governments, such as those in Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile? Has ideological iden-
tity had an impact on all these governments’ practices and policies regarding the media and 
journalistic institutions? While not denying the importance of other factors in traditional su-
pra-ideological governmental repertoires with respect to press and media, this paper demon-
strates that ideology is indeed relevant in explaining some of the recent features of govern-
mental communications and media policies in Latin America. 
By exploring the impact of leftist identity, ideas, and agendas on some governments, the 
paper stresses that there is some specificity in the media activism of leftist governments. 
Those governments that have been part of Latin America’s so-called left turn, though they 
face extremely diverse constraints, share certain critical views that influence their public 
communication practices and their media policy agendas. 
Nonetheless, as this paper argues, these common views do not stem from a shared leftist 
essence. Rather, the commonality originates in the legacy of neoliberalism. The market reforms 
                                                 
1  Politicized accounts of the left have viewed this differently, blaming regional media for functioning as the 
“frontline combat groups” of economic establishments which, incapable of retaining political power in the 
electoral arena, bitterly resist these governments’ reformist agendas by means of denying their legitimacy 
(O’Schaughnessy 2007, Kozloff 2008). 
2  Comparative political communications research has shown little interest in ideological orientations, since its 
establishment as a research field has been linked to the convergent homogenization of media systems and to 
the worldwide depoliticization and standardization of media management techniques by political actors. This 
may change following the recent political polarization of US networks. 
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of the 1990s led to unprecedented change in the Latin American media landscape (Waisbord 
2000, Hughes 2006, Lugo Ocando 2008). Expansion, concentration, and commercialization gave 
media institutions a new relevance in social and political life. With the backlash against neolib-
eralism, these institutions’ association with social and economic elites and their lack of discur-
sive autonomy and distance in relation to the latter exposed the media as instruments of the 
powerful, thereby revitalizing media-critical discourses and dormant reformist traditions in 
the region. In those countries where governments claiming leftist identities or agendas 
emerged, these latter views penetrated government strategies, practices, and policy agendas. 
Section 2 of this paper assesses the empirical phenomenon for three interrelated dimen-
sions of this media activism: (1) government discourse on and understanding of the media, (2) 
direct-communication devices and attitudes regarding journalism, and (3) media regulation 
policies. This condensed description and a brief outline of the variation among the cases allows 
for the evaluation of contending explanations of leftist Latin American governments’ media ac-
tivism. It is argued that the current dyadic distinctions between the populist and nonpopulist 
left obscure important commonalities, while the nuances and contrasts in the media politics of 
the various governments can be better viewed when placed on a continuum according to the 
historical, structural, and institutional constraints these governments have faced. 
Section 3 provides more detailed narrative descriptions, in accordance with the three di-
mensions, of the experiences of the Kirchners in Argentina, Lagos and Bachelet in Chile, Evo 
Morales in Bolivia, Lula in Brazil, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, and 
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. The final and concluding section considers the phenomena as-
sessed in the paper from the perspective of broader global and regional trends and advances 
some further observations on the diffusion of leftist views in governmental media activism. 
2. Assessing and Explaining Media Activism on the Part of Leftist Latin American 
Governments 
Governments’ Public Media Discourse 
The first dimension that characterizes leftist governments is their discourse about press and 
media. The former share a critical vision of the latter institutions’ role in society and politics. 
However, what makes them stand out from other governments is that most of them have 
gone public with these critiques, although with varying intensity and political success.3 This 
strategy, aimed at unveiling the media institutions’ true nature and providing evidence of the 
bias and partisanship behind their self-presentation as impartial bodies, seeks to undermine 
their credibility and public legitimacy. 
                                                 
3  “Going public” has been described as a political strategy that seeks to mobilize support for a given policy 
through direct public appeals so as to curb resistance from other institutional actors (Kernell 1997). 
8 Kitzberger: The Media Activism of Latin America’s Leftist Governments 
It has been argued that publicly criticizing the media for “bad news” biases or “stigma-
tizing” them as “oppositional weapons” in order to undermine their influence has been 
common to most Latin American executives (Ruiz 2010). What distinguishes the leftist gov-
ernments as a subgroup in this regard is that most of their public allusions are framed by 
some common ideological assumptions. Although all political and social actors in the region 
have come to perceive the media as increasingly influential and have developed some practi-
cal responses, this response on the part of the left has taken a particular form. A common nu-
cleus can be observed beyond particular contexts and inflections. The core assumption is that 
media and journalistic institutions are, despite their claims of neutrality, powerful social ac-
tors linked to the upper classes, social elites, or powerful corporations. Be they instrumental-
ist perspectives that view the press as the mouthpiece of the establishment or structural per-
spectives that view the media as constructors of neoliberal common sense through anony-
mous logics, these visions share the idea that within the media sphere power is not distrib-
uted democratically but according to social power. In fact, media power is viewed as essen-
tial to the maintenance of the status quo. Hostility on the part of the media is therefore inter-
preted as part of the resistance by the upper classes and established powerful interests to the 
reformist and democratizing agendas of progressive governments. 
Consequently, these characterizations alternatively call for the democratization of access 
and voice in the media sphere, for reforms to media structures, or even for Gramscian counter-
hegemonic strategies. In some cases these claims are framed in terms of radical participatory 
views of democracy, while in others they are referenced in terms of representative democracy. 
However, they all share the idea that voice equalization is essential to democracy. This democ-
ratic imperative, as will be seen further on, underlies public- and alternative-media policies. 
Public confrontation between presidents and the media has been a salient feature of politics 
in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina. In one in two public appearances, Chávez 
makes negative references to the media. Correa, Morales and the Kirchners probably follow 
close behind him.4 Though existent, this type of public confrontation has been more sporadic 
in Brazil and Uruguay; in Chile it is nonexistent. In the most radicalized cases, it is the presi-
dents themselves who seem to go public with confrontational appeals. Nevertheless, as dis-
cussed further on, governments’ public questioning of the media does not necessarily take 
place only through presidential discourse. It can also occur at lower levels of government; in 
aligned media; and through allied parties, unions, web communities, or other grassroots or-
ganizations. In brief, governmental practices of contesting big media can be performed either 
in a vertical and centralized manner, or, simultaneously or alternatively, in a more decentral-
ized and capillary fashion. The discussion of the second analytical dimension takes up both 
types of practices. 
                                                 
4  In a random sample of 103 of Chávez’s Aló Presidente transcripts, the topic appeared in 45 (44 percent). In Kirch-
ner’s case, as a case study shows, out of 862 presidential discourses, allusions to the media, mostly negative, were 
registered in 220 (25 percent) (Vincent 2009). This rate may have increased during Cristina Fernández’s term. 
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Direct-Communication Devices and Journalistic Conventions 
The second dimension that characterizes leftist governments concerns their public communi-
cation strategies and their relationships with the media and journalism as mediating institu-
tions. Leftist governments tend to deploy particular media practices intended for direct 
communication with large publics. These range from centralized modalities such as regular 
or sporadic presidential broadcasts, traveling cabinets, and the communicative instrumen-
talization of public occasions or ceremonies, to more decentralized practices using diverse 
communication platforms. The purpose of these practices is to bypass and contest main-
stream media journalism, which is deemed to be dominated by media owners and therefore 
biased and distorting. In fact, these innovations are usually accompanied by a rejection of 
journalistic conventions such as press conferences, regular contact between official sources 
and journalists, interviews, etc. 
The most noteworthy of these strategies has been the hosting by presidents of television or 
radio programs on a regular basis. Chávez’s Aló Presidente is the most reputed example, and 
variations on this format have been introduced by Correa, Lula and, on occasion, Morales. Ad-
ditionally, most of the presidencies—with the exception of Chile—have made extensive use of 
“permanent campaign” tactics as regular forms of direct communication. “Itinerant cabinets,” 
presidential tours, and other controlled institutional events have developed into a way of plac-
ing prepackaged or relatively “unfiltered” messages in noncontrolled media. 
These practices upset press corps since they neglect the journalists’ professional routines. 
Other less visible conventions have been broken as well. Most governments have introduced 
vertical source control, which means that their officials are not allowed to have press contact 
on politically relevant matters without authorization from above. The resulting lack of decla-
rations collides with the journalistic need to get news on a daily basis. Journalists thus feel 
threatened as professionals, and even in spite of their ideological sympathy, they turn away 
from governments. This distancing in turn strengthens governmental perceptions of journal-
ists as being controlled by media owners and further reinforces the above-mentioned direct-
communication impulses. 
At this point, some important questions arise: Do these practices belong exclusively to 
the repertoire of leftist governments in the region? Aren’t the disciplining of sources, “keep-
ing on message,” and other related techniques part of the “war-room” style of modern politi-
cal communication popularized by the British New Labour? Is regular presidential broad-
casting an ideological trend? Do Chávez’s direct-communication practices not more closely 
resemble those of Colombian right-wing populist Álvaro Uribe than those of the other leftist 
governments? The latter’s regularly broadcasted Concejos Comunales are frequently compared 
to Aló Presidente. To some observers, Uribe seems closer to Chávez in this respect than the 
moderate left wingers in the region. Such visions (those of the observers mentioned in the 
sentence above) argue that it is populism and its inherent rejection of political mediation that 
explains communication style, not ideology (Waisbord 2003, Rincón 2008). 
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All of the above contentions hold some truth. Nevertheless, closer observation shows that 
ideology does matter. First, the meaning attributed by government agents to their own actions 
and the framework within which such action is publicly explained rest upon ideological un-
derstandings of the media’s role. Second, populism—rather than a commitment to a particular 
cause—may be the form of politics (and political communication) acquired by governments 
born in the wake of a crisis in representative institutions (party system, legislatures, and also 
media). Third, ideological views make governmental courses of action intelligible, they are not 
a posteriori instrumental rationalizations of essentially authoritarian impulses against press 
freedom. Beyond discourse, ideology impacts the aggregate repertoire of government prac-
tices, defining government in a more inclusive way so that it comprises various formal and in-
formal allied or co-opted groups. Focusing on government practices at a more decentralized 
level then highlights those features that nonleftist governments (populist or not) do not pos-
sess. The decentralized or capillary levels are not separate from government; rather, they con-
stitute an integral part of a distinctive media activism carried out by leftist governments which 
is intended to denaturalize and criticize the dominant media discourse. 
One example of these decentralized practices is the state media’s politically aligned air-
time. Pro-government use of state media is a common practice. What is innovative is the exis-
tence of certain broadcasts specifically intended to unveil and contest the political and ideo-
logical biases of private media. Despite some differences between them, Argentina and 
Venezuela provide examples that have achieved public resonance and have significantly con-
tributed to government’s questioning of private media. 
At the grassroots level and on the Internet a myriad of discussion forums, blogs, web-
sites, community media, and publishing enterprises, all carrying discourses critical of main-
stream media, emerged establishing a sort of counter-information trench war. These base-
level initiatives aimed at questioning media credibility are linked to governments in different 
ways. In some cases, the link is limited to informal alliances with preexisting autonomous 
groups. Where governments are based on strong party organizations, as in Brazil and Uru-
guay, the grassroots activities tend to be embedded in the latter. In other cases, most notably 
Venezuela, the state plays a major role in shaping such decentralized initiatives. 
In sum, if we focus solely on presidential activity, Uribe and Chávez may share the key 
goal of centralizing their personal authority through their direct-communication strategies, 
as explanations based on populism stress. But the Bolivarian leader’s communications aims 
do not stop there. He is also building a revolutionary counterhegemony.5 What further dif-
ferentiates Venezuela’s experiences from those of Colombia is not only the ideological orien-
tation of its discourse, but also its consequent fostering of market-alternative communica-
tions networks as part of governmental media policy. Except Chile, which displays none of 
the features discussed in this section, all the cases considered share—with varying inten-
                                                 
5  For some left-wing critics, both aims are contradictory as Chávez’s personalism undermines a new hegemonic 
construction in the long run (Cannon 2009). 
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sity—a politics of circumventing and/or subverting the dominant media/journalistic dis-
course. This politics is informed by critical leftist ideas such as hegemony, voice inequality, 
class or race biases in the media, popular empowerment, and democratization. 
Media Policy and Regulation 
The third dimension that characterizes leftist governments concerns media regulation. In con-
trast to the deregulation and market-oriented policies that during the neoliberal 1990s in-
creased the commercial media presence, leftist policies foster re-regulation in 
the communications domain, state protagonism, and market-alternative forms of media. These 
policies aim to rebalance the presence of market, state, and civil society in the media landscape. 
They can be divided into the following categories: state media–creation policies, measures ori-
ented to private media–sector regulation, and community media–fostering policies. The ulti-
mate goal of revitalizing market-alternative media logics is to democratize the public sphere. 
Most of the countries under discussion here have seen the creation of new state media or 
the reinforcement of existing ones. State television and radio stations have been launched in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina, while in Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela state 
ownership has also extended to print media. Oppositional voices have generally objected to 
state media expansion as outright propaganda politics. In the region, any such policy at-
tempt is rapidly stigmatized as “Venezolanization.” However, aligned programming has also 
been defended outside Venezuela, where it is usually justified with claims regarding the illu-
sory neutrality of oppositional private media. Elsewhere, governments have noticed that the 
public perception of state media as partisan entails a political cost. Inside these institutions, 
media professionals often clash with political cadres who follow the government line. 
With respect to the re-regulation of private commercial media, various types of restric-
tions have been set up (or at least announced) at the constitutional, legislative, and adminis-
trative levels. The first kind of restriction concerns media ownership and market concentra-
tion. The second type of restriction concerns media content, such as national production quo-
tas; multicultural programming; and lastly, in some cases, content qualifications such as 
truthfulness of information clauses. Such content quotas are inspired by protectionism, cul-
tural nationalism, and worries about US cultural imperialism. In this sense, Lula or Chávez 
can be equally heard criticizing cheap imported stuff. A third kind of regulation indirectly af-
fects private media profits. These concern the establishment of mandatory airtime or press 
space for public interest or educational purposes, right-of-reply clauses, and the provision of 
access for market-weak voices. 
Regulatory policy agendas have, nevertheless, often remained rhetorical and have not 
always been consistently pursued. This gap between rhetoric and policy can be explained by 
factors such as institutional weakness; colonized bureaucracies; or, as is more relevant to the 
cases under discussion here, tactical settlements with powerful media actors. 
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The last but still significant media policy feature affects the realm of community or grass-
roots media. The politics of giving civil society public standing as a legitimate actor, and fos-
tering community broadcasting beneath the level of state- and market-driven media, has 
been defended as access equalization, enfranchisement, voice pluralism, and the leveling of 
the playing field. Public recognition of community media as legitimate actors; tripartite radio 
electric spectrum reserves for public, private commercial and private noncommercial opera-
tors; and other measures have been included in constitutions and legislation. 
In most cases, new legislation picks up on reform proposals developed by civil society 
groups engaged in media democratization. This has provided governments with some sec-
toral support. Nevertheless, these groups have not been unconditional allies. A frequent 
complaint on the part of community operators is that formal barriers (antenna power limits, 
confinement to rural areas, administrative costs) and informal thresholds (centralized ad-
ministration inaccessible to remote groups) still persist, thereby favoring big interests. Offi-
cial alternative media policies also awaken fears of co-optation, instrumentalization, and loss 
of autonomy in community broadcasters. 
The three analytical dimensions discussed above generalize a sort of ideal-typical model 
of leftist governments’ media activism, against which empirical cases can be contrasted. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the main features of leftist media activism in the cases explored. As can be 
seen from the table, the governments under consideration perform differently for each di-
mension. What factors best account for the differences? Can these differences be explained 
by maintaining the existence of a common leftist core? Does Chile fall within the boundaries 
of leftist media activism? 
The current polarization in regional political debates has made the politically laden claims 
regarding the existence of “two lefts” dominant.6 This understanding has widely permeated 
the current debate in media politics as well. Differences have been reduced to dichotomies 
such as “populist” versus “nonpopulist,” “authoritarian” versus “democratic,” and “archaic” 
versus “modern” lefts. According to such depictions, media confrontation and media reform 
policies are a function of personalistic or autocratic impulses intended to reduce freedom of 
expression and suppress dissent. Leftism, according to this view, is merely an instrumental fa-
cade used to gain support; at best it is an expression of political immaturity and irresponsibil-
ity. In opposition to this “immature” left is the “mature” left, which has learned the lessons of 
history and accepts press freedom as part of democratic politics (Petkoff 2005, Castañeda 2006). 
I argue that these binary distinctions obscure important commonalities and continuities. 
The nuanced differences summarized in the table may be more consistently explained, fol-
lowing Kenneth Roberts (2008, with Levitsky 2008, 1995), by looking at the variable histori-
cal, structural, and institutional constraints that have shaped and conditioned the agendas 
pushed forward by these various governments. 
                                                 
6  For an overview of these distinctions and critical discussions see Ramírez Gallegos (2006). 
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Table 1: Key Features of Leftist Media Activism in Latin America 
 Venezuela
H. Chávez 
Ecuador
R. Correa
Bolivia 
E. Morales 
Argentina 
N. Kirchner/
C. F. Kirchner 
Brazil 
Lula 
Uruguay 
T. Vázquez 
Chile 
R. Lagos/ 
M. Bachelet 
Governmental public  
media discourse  + + + + +/- +/- - 
Centralized  
Presidential  
broadcasting 
yes yes 
yes  
(but irregular) 
no yes no no 
Permanent campaign  
and disciplining tactics 
+ + + + + +/- - 
Defiance of journalistic  
conventions 
yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Decentralized  
Direct-communication  
devices and journalistic  
circumvention in public  
communication tactics 
“Counterhegemonic”  
questioning of media 
+ n.d. n.d. + + +/- - 
State media expansion + + + + + - - 
Restrictive regulation  
of commercial media 
+ + +/- + - - - 
Media policy and  
regulation 
Policies fostering  
community media 
+ + + + - + +/- 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
A focus on institutional stability, for example, may illuminate differences in the form of me-
dia activism. The governments in those countries that have experienced a party system col-
lapse at some point and that have, therefore, emerged from new movements or as outsiders 
have been more radical in all media activism dimensions than those that stemmed from insti-
tutionalized politics. 
It is precisely the context of institutional collapse that has led to the emergence of politi-
cal outsiders who have evolved into personalist (or populist) leaders. For instance, the ab-
sence of preexisting, credible organizational vehicles has made the use of direct public ap-
peals through the media a key means of mobilizing support for Rafael Correa (Conaghan 
and De la Torre 2008). On the other hand, given the weakness of existing party organizations 
after such a collapse, oppositional voices also tend to converge in the media in their attempts 
to gain access to the public sphere (Ramírez Gallegos 2008). In sum, in contexts where party 
organizations have lost ground, the media become—in the eyes of all political actors—the 
key arena for mobilizing public support. 
These factors are important in explaining public communication practices, but they do 
not exhaustively account for the radical media policies of some governments. The collapse of 
representative institutions went hand in hand with a popular backlash against neoliberalism; 
this backlash in turn fueled radical projects that involved the transformation of a media land-
scape perceived as being a constitutive part of the old order. Weakly institutionalized opposi-
tions, intense popular mobilization by governments, and windfall hydrocarbon rents, as seen 
in Venezuela, Bolivia or Ecuador, encouraged ambitious transformative projects and new 
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forms of popular sovereignty; these were in contrast to the more constrained ambitions of the 
leftist governments in Brazil, Uruguay, or Chile, with Argentina’s ambitions lying some-
where in the middle (Roberts 2008). As for other policy areas, the real or perceived structural 
and institutional constraints determined how far leftist governments could go in public con-
frontation with the media and in direct-communication practices, as well as how radical their 
media reform policies could be. 
The collapse of political institutions can usually not be separated from a crisis in media 
and journalistic institutions. The discredited political parties and elites are usually intimately 
linked to the large media conglomerates. Not only do the two share a similar social back-
ground, and sometimes even close family ties, but their links also rest mostly on reciprocal 
arrangements that have secured their respective interests. In this way, the new political sce-
narios represent a break in traditional settlements and understandings between political and 
media elites. In such contexts, the already weak culture of newsroom autonomy in the region 
tends to disappear given the owners’ impulse to defend their endangered positions through 
their media. By displacing political elites, political newcomers also block big media interests 
from access to key governmental levers they formerly controlled. This loss of control ex-
plains the latter’s aggressive, and sometimes cartelized, responses (Botía 2007). 
In Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia it is clearly evident that the crisis of the previous re-
gimes’ representative institutions was paralleled by a crisis in media credibility. This explains 
why Chávez, Correa, and Morales have been able to successfully present the old political 
class and the media as agents of the powerful minorities they themselves oppose. In contrast, 
where media credibility is higher, as in Argentina, Brazil, or Uruguay, open confrontation 
may be a riskier move politically. 
Correa’s success in connecting media elites to the discredited banking institutions and po-
litical actors is a key example. In Bolivia, big media’s collusion with the increasingly unpopular 
political elite, which governed until 2005, became evident during the mobilization process that 
drove Evo Morales to the presidency (Gómez Vela 2006). In both these cases, big media’s credi-
bility crisis occurred prior to the left turn and, as will be seen, determined the perceptions and 
strategic stances of the nascent leadership. These crises not only shaped the new elites’ views 
on the media—since they undermined the image of media institutions as a credible, represen-
tative and fair mirror of society—but also provided the new governments with political room 
to maneuver and encouraged them to push forward a radical media politics. 
The same process occurred in Venezuela, although the episodes that brought about the 
media’s credibility crisis occurred subsequent to governmental change. As Ellner (2008: 109) 
argues, the prevailing discussions, which focus on Chávez’s populist style and personality, 
neglect the consistency and steady radicalization of his policies. Further radicalization has 
occurred each time the opposition has experienced a political setback. Its obsession with re-
moving Chavez led the opposition to disdain political organization and to resort to putschist 
and anti-institutional strategies. These failed attempts had the consequence of further radi-
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calizing the government’s policy agendas. The evidence of this disdain for institutional poli-
tics was manifested in the media’s cartelized oppositional behavior during the 2002/03 crises 
and the resulting collapse in media credibility (Díaz Rangel 2002, Botía 2007). Instead of the 
authoritarian personality ascribed to Chávez, it is actually Venezuela’s institutional weakness 
that accounts more for the radicalization of Bolivarian communication politics. Radicalism in 
media activism is not caused by populism. Rather, both phenomena are possible under the 
same structural conditions. The views and ends that inform and shape media activism in the 
countries under consideration can be better understood by focusing on ideology 
Although Argentina suffered a partial collapse of its party system, its institutional crisis 
was not as extreme as those in the Andean countries. Despite their hegemony in the legislative 
arena, the Kirchners initially faced some constraints from civic and interest-based organiza-
tions, the media, and governors (Levitsky and Murillo 2008). These existing political and socie-
tal constraints notwithstanding, the Kirchners radicalized their confrontation with the media. 
This radicalization took place after a long agrarian strike that was backed by some of the big 
news media. As a result, the Kirschners’ popularity levels fell spectacularly by 2008 and they 
lost the midterm elections. Nevertheless, the radicalized media activism they pursued after 
2008 seems to have significantly affected the credibility of the media confronted: the govern-
ment exposed the dominance of extra-journalistic values in news coverage with some success. 
All the constraints referred to above impose limits upon governmental action. But the 
perception of those limits varies according to the prior experiences and contingent prudential 
judgments of governmental actors. Governments do not always act in a coherent fashion 
across different sectors of government and across time. In terms of the attitude towards the 
media and public communications, different views generally coexist inside government en-
tourages and broader governing coalitions, as the Brazilian case makes visible. Inside the pe-
tista government, ideological hardliners compete with advisors more inclined to compromise 
in the face of media interests or journalistic demands. As insider narratives reveal, Lula, who 
is himself divided between historical convictions and pragmatism, picks up one or the 
other’s agenda depending on the circumstances (Kotscho 2006). The moderation of media 
policy results from the political need to achieve compromises with the parliamentary opposi-
tion and established power agents, whose interests are intertwined with those of the media 
elites. In Brazil, the dashing of grassroots groups’ media policy expectations and the accom-
modation of political and market interests have been linked to the political realignments the 
Lula government has experienced. 
In contrast to the case in Brazil or Uruguay, in Chile the governing Socialist Party elites 
do not appear to be torn between their views and what is politically feasible when in gov-
ernment. Their public (and private) conformity with the status quo in the media sphere 
makes it legitimate to ask whether Chile is still a case of leftist media activism. This paper’s 
focus on constraints allows us to include them—at least analytically. As Roberts (1995) shows 
from a historical perspective, after Allende’s fall the formerly radical socialists underwent a 
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process of self-reflection that led to their moderation; due to the strategic logic and institu-
tional confines of the democratic transition, they later became the hegemonic party of the 
Chilean left. Aware of the limited political room left by the new institutional scenario, this al-
ready ideologically changed left entered into redemocratization seeking moderation—that is, 
looking after allies in the center of the electoral arena, not risking grassroots mobilization, 
remaining cautiously pragmatic, and relying on elite-level bargaining with the rightist oppo-
sition and business. Leftist media critics remained circumscribed to the so-called “extra-
parliamentary left”; they remained outside of government. 
In the next section a detailed descriptive narrative account of the country cases shows 
how the various constraints discussed above have been reflected in the leftist governments’ 
media activism. 
3. The Country Experiences 
Chávez’s rise to power as a result of the total collapse of the former political order and the 
crisis of its political and media institutions explains Venezuela’s position as the most radical-
ized in all the media activism dimensions. Through the successive phases of his govern-
ment’s radicalization, Chávez’s antagonism in reference to the media escalated. From the out-
set in 1999, the president frequently criticized the media’s coverage of government as dis-
torted. He attributed this distortion to the fact that both the printed press and commercial 
television were controlled by an “oligarchy” used to a past of privilege, stating that this oli-
garchy was resisting the ending of its privilege by a newly empowered “people.” After the 
episodes of 2002 and 2003,7 in which the media played an eminently political role, as exhib-
ited in their cartelized and conspiratorial behavior, Chávez began to call them—somewhat 
justifiably—“putschists” (golpistas). He has since regularly denounced their “terror cam-
paigns” as intended to destabilize government. 
Given the US administration’s and US media organizations’ overt support of the Vene-
zuelan opposition, Chávez’s revolutionary narrative increasingly played the anti-imperialist 
chord (Ellner 2008: 196-202). As of 2002 no distinction was made between the behavior of na-
                                                 
7  In April 2002 the president fired the national oil company’s board of directors, thereby setting off a series of 
protests and massive strikes. The protesters, encouraged by the business elite and some unions, received 
privileged attention from the private media. On April 11, army officials detained Chávez and announced that 
he had resigned. This statement was not questioned by the private media. In the following days the media si-
lenced loyal army officials and ignored the massive pro-Chávez rallies. Ultimately, this popular mobilization, 
the divided military, and key defections among the putschists drove Chávez back to the presidency. Later, 
from December 2002 to January 2003, a new “civic strike” demonstrated the polarization between media and 
government. During these new protests, the broadcast media suspended regular programming and the 
printed press reduced its editions to coverage of the opposition’s collective action (Tanner Hawkins 2003, 
Cannon 2009). Many of the initiatives and strategies behind this oppositional mobilization were born out of 
regular media owners’ and editors’ meetings (Botía 2007: 271-295). 
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tional private media and the international networks (especially CNN). The “imperialist,” 
“hegemonic,” “capitalist,” and “neoliberal” character of their uniform voice is, according to 
this perspective, a natural product of the alliance between local oligarchs and the US gov-
ernment8 (Zúquete 2008). This conglomerate occupies the role of the “counterrevolutionary” 
force. Additionally, with the rise of the idea of “twenty-first-century socialism,” Chávez be-
gan to criticize the media for promoting individualistic and egoistic values, as opposed to the 
new revolutionary consciousness required. 
In addition to anti-imperialism, there is a second way in which the Bolivarian discourse 
transcends national boundaries. This is through the idea that real independence from impe-
rialism can only be achieved through joint Latin American strategies and “international soli-
darity” against US hegemony (Ellner 2008: 189). This regional perspective on the part of the 
Bolivarian revolution has practical consequences in the media realm since it is the ideological 
pillar of initiatives such as Telesur and those supporting regional alternative-media policies. 
All these views, embedded in a narrative of popular redemption, coexist and are inter-
twined with the secular topic of voice democratization. At a rally in April 2007 Chávez de-
fended the nonrenewal of Radio Caracas Televisión’s (RCTV) license as the returning to the 
people of something they owned—the radio electric spectrum—and that they had been 
stripped off 50 years previously by a family from the rich oligarchy. Back in popular hands, 
frequencies were to be redistributed to transmit the voices of the previously excluded. 
Hugo Chávez popularized regular presidential broadcasting with his Aló Presidente. This 
paradigmatic example of direct communication started in 1999 as a radio broadcast; since 
2000 it has also aired on television on Sundays and has an average length of five hours. In the 
beginning, a talk show format prevailed. The president answered calls from common people, 
listened to their problems, advised and provided solutions, thereby displaying a strong iden-
tification with popular sectors previously excluded from public life. The program’s granting 
of visibility to the poor explains its immediate popularity (Cañizález 2003: 33). Since then the 
broadcast has also entailed other performative functions. Touring locations around the coun-
try, the president has often required government officials to attend, questioning them about 
the topics of the day. He has also used the program to issue orders, threaten domestic adver-
saries or criticize international rivals. It has been observed that Chávez has invented a way to 
stage government through television (Anderson 2008). Aló Presidente plays a central role in 
setting the public agenda. The president’s televised deeds are usually Monday’s Venezuelan 
news headlines. Simultaneously, the Bolivarian leader has devised his broadcast as a peda-
gogical vehicle for the popular indoctrination in the ideas of twenty-first-century socialism.9 
In addition to Aló Presidente, the mandatory broadcasting of presidential speeches (cade-
nas) has become a frequent resource for direct communication. Especially during times of po-
litical crisis, Chávez has justified the mechanism as a way to fight the “lies” and “disinforma-
                                                 
8  Chávez often derides media owners as pitiyanqui (Yankee-lover) bourgeoisie. 
9  Online: <www.alopresidente.gob.ve/historia/28/1633> (15 March 2010). 
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tion” of the private media.10 In 2007, Chávez’s critics had counted 1513 cadenas totaling 890 
transmission hours (Cañizalez 2007). 
As for decentralized direct-communication tactics, Venezuela has pioneered the use of 
politically aligned airtime on state television with La Hojilla, a show hosted by a Bolivarian 
cadre dressed in a red shirt who disputes what is said daily in the private media. Via alterna-
tive communication platforms, counterhegemonic communication practices have also multi-
plied. Nevertheless, the key trait of this civil society mobilization is that “the state has played 
a central role in giving form” to it, despite the grassroots movement’s anti-statist slant (Ellner 
2008: 180). Indeed, the Ministry of Communications and Information plays a central role in 
organizing decentralized counterinformation strategies. Its activities range from financing 
the publication of dozens of media-critical books to deploying comandos juveniles de guerilla 
comunicacional trained to respond private media lies in the streets and on the Web.11 
Venezuela has also been a leader in the creation of state media. In addition to revamping 
the preexisting national television and radio stations (VTV and RNV), the administration has 
created two further nationwide television stations (Vive TV and TVes).12 The state-controlled 
radio network has also been expanded. And, consistent with its geopolitical views, the Boli-
varian government is now the main stakeholder in Telesur, the regional news network con-
ceived of as both a vehicle for Latin American integration and a weapon against US-based in-
formation dominance (Lugo Ocando 2008).13 
Despite a wider content diversity than presumed by their critics,14 much of these media 
outlets’ programming is overtly aligned with the defense of the Bolivarian revolution. This 
alignment is deemed legitimate due to the ongoing ideological warfare. Andrés Izarra—the 
ex-RCTV news producer who has held key communications roles in government since 
2002—has justified this expansion of media outlets as part of a Gramscian war, not incom-
patible with pluralism, to win the minds and hearts of the people and against the capitalist 
hegemony reproduced by private media.15 
                                                 
10  In the wake of the 2002 crisis, oppositional protests received privileged coverage from the private media as 
part of a “communications strategy” intended to demonstrate their massiveness (Cañizález 2003: 35). On April 
11 the government sought to thwart the opposition’s dominance of the screens by compelling the broadcasters 
to transmit the presidential message with cadenas. Broadcasters evaded this measure by “splitting” the screen. 
That same day, Chávez was ousted. The developments that drove Chávez back to government were in part a 
dispute for control over what the Venezuelan public could see, hear, and read. 
11  Online: <www.minci.gob.ve>. 
12  TVes operates on the band and with the equipment of the ousted RCTV. 
13  The interstate station initiated broadcasts in mid-2005. The initial stakeholders were Venezuela (51 percent), 
Argentina (20 percent), Cuba (19 percent), and Uruguay (10 percent). Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua joined 
later as minor participants. 
14  Vive TV, for instance, has been recognized by independent observers for its innovative participatory productions. 
15  El Nacional, November 8, 2007. 
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The restrictions on private commercial media in Venezuela are not that explicit at the leg-
islative and constitutional levels. Given the gaps in legislation, policy formation has instead 
proceeded through discretionary administrative decisions taken by regulatory authorities. To 
most observers, the underlying rationale of those decisions has been a response to the polari-
zation between Chávez and the private media. Over time, the number of commercial media 
licenses has stagnated. In some cases expired licenses have not been renewed, on the basis of 
alleged violations of regulatory laws. The most controversial case involved RCTV, the most 
confrontational television broadcaster since 2002. The nonrenewal of its license in 2007 was 
attributed to its “putschist” behavior during the crisis of April 2002 (Cañizález 2007, AMARC 
2009). Other restrictions to private media profits have resulted from the 2004 “Ley de Re-
sponsabilidad de Radio y Television” content regulations on violence, discrimination, sched-
ules for children’s programming, and, last but not least, the frequency of presidential cadenas. 
In addition, the 2000 Venezuelan Telecommunications Act transformed the informal ille-
gal broadcasters into recognized “public service community media,” while also committing 
the state to their development through financial aid. In fact, as of 2000 the number of com-
munity radio and television operators grew exponentially. Official backing further acceler-
ated after 2003, when Chávez realized the decisive role that community media had played in 
the street mobilizations after the coup (Ellner 2008: 179-180; Sel 2009: 29). Despite these im-
provements in community media policy, some community operators perceive the regulations 
discussed above to “compromise, indirectly, the independence of these media.”16 
Ecuador’s leftist government also emerged in the context of a crisis of representative institu-
tions and a plebiscitarian confrontation with the “old order.” Correa’s rise to power began 
with nothing more than his direct appeals to the public. 
Rafael Correa’s discourse about the media was decisively shaped by his path to the 
presidency as a political outsider. His campaign discourse combined the rejection of neolib-
eralism and disdain for the political class (the “partidocracia”). He presented himself as a 
newcomer without links to the ruling elites, close to the people, and determined to reverse 
the historical domination of the country by the establishment (Conaghan 2008). Similarly to 
Chávez, although not in such a radical manner, Correa succeeded in constructing himself as 
a strong political authority opposed to an old and discredited order identified with tradi-
tional political, social, and, notably, media elites. 
Significantly, in his 2009 inaugural speech as president under the new constitution, 
Correa placed the media at the heart of the historical juncture: “We have defeated those who 
held power in order to exert it on behalf of the privileged, but not power itself. There are still 
‘poderes fácticos,’ especially that terrible power which is the informative power.”17 In his view, 
                                                 
16  For example, the cost of the technical reports required for licenses is an economic barrier that government it-
self lowers, providing subventions and credits for broadcasting equipment (AMARC 2009). 
17  Author’s translation. 
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the Ecuadorian press had historically presented itself as a “moral” and “infallible” guardian 
of the public interest, thus hiding its true self. The problem in his eyes was the contradiction 
inherent in a “private business providing a public good” to the point of endangering democ-
racy. It was government’s task, he concluded, to unmask this political player lacking democ-
ratic legitimacy.18 In his view, the Ecuadorian press, like the press in the rest of the region, 
had played a political role as a defender of the status quo and had “always been against pro-
gressive governments in Latin America.”19 
In addition, Correa repeatedly reminded his listeners that most private media were 
owned by banking institutions, something which gave them unjustified power: “You talk 
about regulating the interest tax or diminishing the costs of banking services […] and you 
will see the campaign that mounts against you.” Correa has frequently downplayed journal-
ists as bank clerks, thereby indicating their lack of autonomy. 
During his first presidential campaign in 2006 Correa had already made successful use of 
the media. After he won the presidency, a constitutional assembly election, a constitutional 
referendum, and a general election (under the new constitution) all took place in less than 
two years. Through this plebiscitary path the government naturalized a “permanent cam-
paign” style: “The ‘war room’ of the 2006 election campaign was recreated in the presidential 
palace” (Conaghan and De la Torre 2008: 274). 
At the beginning of his term, Correa instituted Diálogo con el Presidente, a public radio 
broadcast aired on Saturdays. Often smartly combined with “traveling cabinets,” this format 
has successfully enhanced governmental contact with local communities while reaching na-
tionwide audiences (Conaghan and De la Torre 2008). Similarly to the case in Venezuela, cade-
nas have also played an important role as a direct-communication device. In the various elec-
toral contests, Correa has resorted heavily to existing legal provisions that oblige private 
broadcasters to transmit public-interest content to gain screen presence.20 As president, Correa 
has increasingly rejected direct interviews, press conferences, and other journalistic formats. 
In the realm of media policies, Correa’s first move was the creation of a public newspaper 
through the seizure of a bankrupt Guayaquil paper called El Telégrafo. Public television did 
not exist in Ecuador when he took office, while public radio was almost nonexistent. In 2007 
the government created Ecuador TV, and in 2008 it relaunched Radio Pública de Ecuador. At 
the latter’s opening ceremony Correa defended these media outlets, responding to critiques 
that suspected parallels with Venezuela: 
                                                 
18  Online: <www.presidencia.gov.ec/pdf/Discurso-Posesion%2010%20de%20agosto_pdf_2009.pdf> (5 May 2010). 
19  Reporteros Sin Fronteras, reporte 2008. 
20  During the constitutional referendum, for example, the government imposed—albeit after some negotiation—
the mandatory broadcasting of a program called Conociendo la Constitución by invoking an existing media law 
that envisioned the public use of private television slots for educational purposes. Some media owners argued 
that content was partisan and resisted the mandate. 
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These are not the government’s media, they belong to the Ecuadorians. Many Latin 
American countries have them, as do practically all the developed countries […] Well-
managed public media are tremendously positive for a society because they do not 
have that deep dilemma between the pocketbook and social compromise in communi-
cating objectively.21 
In taking advantage of his initial popularity and the relative lack of credibility of private me-
dia,22 Correa has shown a radical determination to alter ownership relations in the media 
sphere. Regulatory authorities have already reversed some radio licenses and seized television 
stations linked to fraudulently bailed-out banks. Meanwhile, provisionary clauses in the new 
constitution have mandated the sanctioning of a new Communications Act and the formation 
of a committee to audit all previous license-conferring procedures. The new act not only stipu-
lates ownership bans for bank owners and politicians, but also foresees—due to the collusions 
and prevarications the committee has reported—the “redistribution of illegally obtained fre-
quencies” in the interest of the public and community sectors. In sum, while the new constitu-
tion itself contains explicit bans on media monopolies and other restrictions, the bill currently 
being discussed in Ecuador seeks to severely restrict the number of licenses, cross-ownership, 
foreign capital participation, and audience share, and to stipulate spectrum reserves. 
The 2008 constitution guarantees equal rights and access to frequencies for the public, pri-
vate, and community sectors, while the new bill foresees privileging public and community 
sectors until equal spectrum shares are reached. The new regulatory proposals also foresee 
content qualifications, special “citizen tariffs” for advertising in order to guarantee media ac-
cess for weak groups, stipulated airtime for referendum and educational campaigns, and the 
establishment of local and national production quotas in broadcasting. 
In Bolivia, the biased coverage of the political mobilization process that drove Evo Morales to 
the presidency exposed the lack of journalistic professionalism and autonomy—the result of 
the media owners’ own political interests. During the so-called “Guerra del Gas” episodes 
the credibility of the media was questioned by an important part of the public after the net-
works decided to transmit blockbuster movies at the same time as police repression left 63 
protesters dead in La Paz (Gómez Vela 2006). This and other such incidents not only shaped 
and reinforced Morales’s and the movement’s views on the media but also affected the me-
dia’s legitimacy, making radical confrontation a political option. 
This impact of these experiences on the Morales government’s media policy was visible 
from the outset. In his inaugural speech Morales recalled that the movement’s path to power 
had already involved a bitter struggle with the media: 
                                                 
21  El Comercio, August 27, 2008. Author’s translation. 
22  The 2000 financial crisis made banking institutions widely unpopular. This explains Correa’s insistence on their 
links to the media. 
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Thanks, I want to acknowledge some media, some professionals who always advised 
us so that we learned. But some journalists, men and women, permanently demonized 
the social struggle; they permanently condemned us by using lies. Some journalists 
and media subjected us to a sort of media terrorism, as if we were animals, as if we 
were savages.23 
As president, Morales frequently appeals to the people to judge the “disinformation” and 
“distortions” of the private media themselves. Similarly to his Andean counterparts, the in-
terpretations he offers link the media’s behavior to “powerful,” “oligarchic,” “fascist,” “right-
wing,” or “imperialist” interests. But what stands out in Morales’s discourse is the ethnic di-
mension he adds. The media’s voice is depicted as racist and as a continuation of past domi-
nation. In his speeches he often recalls the need to “fight those media that every day fight 
against us, every day denigrate us, every day humiliate us, every day offend us with lies.” 
The construction of “us” is clearly ethnic: “I want to make a very important topic clear: some 
media demonize us, they penalize communitarian justice; they think the death penalty is 
communitarian justice. Totally false.” 
Although regular presidential broadcasts were considered in Bolivia, the government has 
privileged different formats.24 Bolivia is an ethnolinguistically divided country. Large parts 
of the population, especially in the countryside, do not speak Spanish. On the other hand, 
despite his Aymara origin, Morales can only speak Spanish. Additionally, the low level of na-
tional media penetration in distant rural communities makes centralized messages inade-
quate. Given this context, the government’s direct-communication policy has been imple-
mented mainly through networks of local radio stations and complemented by other aligned 
media outlets and presidential tours. Simultaneously, initial government efforts to sustain 
press workers’ sympathy have failed and some incidents between the president and report-
ers have damaged journalist’s sympathy for government.25 
In Bolivia, state television already existed before Morales came to power. His government’s 
efforts in public media policy thus concentrated elsewhere: a state-owned daily paper called 
Cambio was created, while radio was privileged given the audience characteristics. The former 
public broadcaster Radio Illimani, renamed Radio Patria Nueva, became head of a “community 
radio” network of over 30 local stations called Red Nacional de Radios de los Pueblos Indígenas 
y Originarios (RNRPIO). This network was financed with Venezuelan development aid. 
                                                 
23  Online: <http://abi.bo/index.php?i=enlace&j=documentos/discursos/200601/22.01.06Transmision.html> (5 July 2008). 
Translated by the author. 
24  A weekly broadcast called El pueblo es noticia began in 2007. Although critics initially suspected it would func-
tion similarly to Aló Presidente, Morales only sporadically attends as a guest, with other high-ranking govern-
ment officials appearing on an equal basis. Its influence in setting the public agenda remains limited. 
25  At the beginning Morales insisted, “The capitalist system uses the media against government […] At the jour-
nalists’ level, they like me; it is the owners who are campaigning against my government” (Lauría 2007). The 
later deterioration of the government relationship with reporters was exemplified in 2009 when Morales asked 
a reporter during a press conference to prove his newspaper’s accusations against the government. 
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The 2009 Bolivian constitution recognizes community media and commits the state to 
“supporting the creation of community media and providing them with equal conditions 
and opportunities.” Alternative media have in fact experienced significant improvements in 
their legal and material circumstances. Nevertheless, sectoral organizations have complained 
about the confinement of community radio to rural areas and about the government’s inaccu-
rate definition of RNRPIO as “community radio” since the network is a top-down-controlled 
network (AMARC 2009). 
Restrictive policies towards commercial media haven’t gotten very far to date, apart from 
the new constitution’s ban on media monopolies and oligopolies. During the constitutional 
debates some advances in press regulation were attempted. Nevertheless, following gov-
ernment negotiations with part of the opposition, the new constitution ultimately failed to 
regulate issues of journalistic ethics, leaving the matter to self-regulation by the press. How-
ever, the government did issue a mandate obliging newspapers to grant unionized journal-
ists and press workers a daily space to express their opinions. Now, in the aftermath of 
Morales’s recent landslide reelection, official voices have announced that there will be a new 
media law in the near future. 
In Argentina, Néstor Kirchner’s rise to power also followed the collapse of the old party sys-
tem. But in contrast to Chávez or Correa, who came to power without the support of pre-
existing party organizations, the then-unknown Patagonian governor rose to the presidency 
thanks to the Peronist Party, whose capacity for electoral mobilization among low-income 
segments of the population had survived the crisis. Nevertheless, urged to broaden the 
party’s support base, Kirchner announced a “renewal of politics” in an appeal to the non-
Peronist urban middle class. The dispute over these “political orphans” (Torre 2003) lay at 
the heart of Kirchner’s conflict with the media, given the presumed exposure of these mid-
dle-class “orphans” to the media’s presentation of reality. While it remained limited during 
Kirchner’s term, the conflict has radicalized during his wife’s subsequent presidency. 
The Kirchners’ public statements about the media have been embedded in a wider “na-
tional and popular” understanding of recent history related to the Peronist left. According to 
this loosely revisionist viewpoint, the last dictatorship initiated the “neoliberal” stage, which 
lasted through the 1990s until the 2001 crisis. After the crisis, and with Kirchner in the presi-
dency, a remobilization of society and a phase of recovered “autonomy of politics” began. In 
the Kirchners’ view, the media, which they saw as organically linked to the elites in society, 
had played an essential ideological role through the long era of establishment dominance. 
The fact that politics had been colonized by “poderes fácticos” during these years had been re-
flected in the public sphere through the dominance of a “technocratic discourse” that dis-
credited every political vision that deviated from market imperatives. The Kirchners’ saw 
journalism as having being intellectually subordinated to liberal technocratic common sense 
and as dependent on nonelected powers. 
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Kirchner portrayed himself as challenging this state of affairs, frequently framing the 
confrontation as a dispute over representation: the media claimed to represent the public by 
“doing journalism,” while in reality they were “doing politics” on behalf of the same old mi-
nority interests. Against the media’s deceivingly neutral account (relato mediático) of reality, 
the executive saw itself as leading a popular majority already aware of the former’s decep-
tions: “[…] they want to write us down through their newspaper or their media. But they 
have to realize that we Argentineans have already learned to distrust certain things” (Vincent 
2009: 14). This governmental perspective began to be present in 2003 and only became radi-
calized after the 2008 agrarian conflict, during which big media’s coverage was seen to favor 
protesters. Again, the narrative of a powerful minority colonizing the public sphere was used 
to initiate a political dispute intended to recover this public sphere for a democratic majority. 
The Kirchners have not experimented with regular broadcasting. Instead, they have sys-
tematically resorted to controlled events in order to have an impact in noncontrolled media. 
Ceremonies, inaugurations, or official visits have developed into a routine device for deliver-
ing unmediated messages that journalists have baptized “el atril” (“the lectern”).26 The device 
functions—according to a newspaper account—as follows: in the morning cabinet members 
indicate the government “line” on radio newsmagazines; later the president uses the lectern 
to reinforce the topic; and finally, once authorized, the remaining kirchnerista leadership goes 
public with the same line.27 
In fact, government exerts strict control over government officials acting as sources, while 
also denying journalistic conventions. As one veteran journalist stressed, during former gov-
ernments official sources were used to fight factional disputes, “but kirchnerismo arrived and 
things changed; the closed, jealous, compartmentalized style Kirchner imposed modified this 
game’s rules.”28 These tactics, together with Kirchner’s ironic dismissals of reporters’ ques-
tions as being mandated from the media owners above them, made for an uneasy rapport 
with press workers. 
After the 2008 radicalization of the government–media conflict, the government’s direct-
communication strategy began to integrate decentralized tactics. One innovation has been a 
successful television show, which is aired on the public station, called “678”; it has become a 
forum where the deconstruction of ideological, corporate, and journalistic biases is presented 
daily to a mass public. Through its resonance and mobilizing capacity, this format has sig-
nificantly contributed to the government’s questioning of private media’s credibility. At the 
same time, a myriad of pro-government bloggers, tweeters, Facebook groups and other web 
                                                 
26  The 2001 crisis undoubtedly shaped Kirchner’s communication style. During the 2005 mid-term campaign he 
declared that governments that do not exercise a “permanent campaign […] are taken away with the helicop-
ter.” He was referring to the image in the collective memory of De la Rua’s fall. 
27  La Nación, December 14, 2007. 
28  Julio Blanck, “Cristina Kirchner renueva la batalla por la construcción de la realidad”, Clarín December 1, 2007. 
Author’s translation. 
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communities have emerged. Despite accusations of top-down control, the phenomenon 
seems to represent the relatively autonomous backing of the government by primarily 
young, urban, and middle-class progressive kirchnerista groups.29 
The 2008 agrarian conflict was also a turning point in terms of media policies in Argentina. 
Until then no significant expansion of state media had taken place and only timid administra-
tive measures to boost alternative media had been taken. During Kirchner’s term—behind the 
public confrontations—the prevailing attitude towards private media was that of tactical set-
tlements. In contrast to Correa, Kirchner initially chose not to confront the big media groups. 
Instead, his early rulings prevented the Clarín Group, the biggest media conglomerate, from 
losing control of its assets to foreign creditors after the 2001 crisis. Shortly afterwards he de-
creed a 10-year grace period for all television licenses that were about to expire. Later, again 
favoring Clarín, the government allowed a merger of cable providers that granted the con-
glomerate a dominant position in national cable markets. Only later, once Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner had taken power and after the 2008 agrarian conflict had ended with a defeat for 
the government in Congress, did the government, politically weakened and with no political 
support from the middle class to lose, launch a legislative initiative developed by reformist 
civil society groups, the Law for Audiovisual Communication Services. Though the move was 
perceived by some as seeking vengeance for big media’s backing of agro-industrial interests, it 
received support from the center and the left, and from legislators. 
During the heated months of parliamentary debate and after the law was passed, con-
frontation between the government and the media further escalated. Enforcement of the law, 
which has still not begun, would certainly mean that the biggest media groups would be 
forced to get rid of much of their assets.30 In fact, the new law severely restricts license num-
bers, cross-ownership, foreign capital participation, and audience share. It also establishes 
national production quotas and stipulates spectrum reserves. Furthermore, its implementa-
tion would mean the significant expansion of state media and the quantitative multiplication 
of community and alternative media. 
In contrast to all of the above cases, the following group of leftist governments’ rise to power 
did not result from institutional collapses but rather from the game of institutional politics 
and, therefore, from compromises between politicians and established media players. 
What distinguishes the Brazilian government’s media discourse—and that of the gov-
ernments in Uruguay and Chile as well—is that, despite the president’s undisputed leader-
ship, government power is shared with a strong party organization. Therefore, governmental 
discourse does not overlap with presidential discourse, as can be assumed with the above 
                                                 
29  Interview with Beatriz Sarlo, Revista Debate, June 18, 2010. 
30  At the time of writing, the law’s regulatory decree is not yet ready, while the filing of judicial complaints by 
opposition leaders represents a further obstacle to enforcement. The controversy will likely be settled by the 
Supreme Court. 
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cases. Although diminished following the Mensalão scandal, the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT) is still a relevant actor in Brasilia. Rooted in Brazilian leftist culture and with long-term 
experience in union struggles, political campaigning, and local government, the party carries 
a set of shared beliefs about the nature of media institutions and their role in the struggle for 
power. Within the party’s ranks, big media are mainly perceived as class actors. The paolista 
elite newspapers are often termed the “bourgeois press” (Kotscho 2006), a view that rein-
forces perceptions of biased political coverage. 
As part of the political moderation process that led Lula to the presidency in his fourth 
electoral attempt, harsh internal debates about how to cope with the media took place within 
the party. In opposition to party hardliners unwilling to satisfy the media’s rules of the game, 
Lula ultimately headed the 2002 campaign with a party-autonomous pragmatic and techno-
cratic approach towards media imperatives31 (Porto 2003, Miguel 2006). This path condi-
tioned the party’s attitude towards the media once in government. Lula and high-ranking pe-
tistas have been divided between confrontation and appeasement, especially during political 
crises (Kotscho 2006). Although frequently preceded by verbal escalations, the appeasement 
strategy has tended to prevail. Lula has maintained his petista views about media, but pru-
dential judgment has led him to avoid confrontational tactics in most circumstances. 
Nevertheless, Lula himself is a source of inherent tension between government and the 
press. He has come to represent the man of the povo (common people) who has reached the 
top political position, a position which was previously the exclusive domain of social elites. 
His arrival symbolized the democratization of politics. Despite policy moderation, Lula’s 
emergence as a national leader reignited a strong sense of “us” and “them” in Brazilian soci-
ety. His discursive relationship with the media is strongly influenced by the fact that he is 
highly resented and mistrusted from above and unusually connected and identified with the 
masses below. Since the beginning of his presidency the elite press has seen “populism” in 
his direct-communication style; derided his lack of education; and felt persistently irritated 
by his catchphrase “never before in the history of this country,” with which he depicts his 
presidency as a historical turning point. 
Yet after some explosive episodes in his first years, Lula has mostly avoided open con-
frontation.32 His relatively sporadic criticism of the press’s class bias nevertheless applies the 
logic of “them” against “us.” When he publicly criticizes the media, he usually brings up 
cases of distorted press coverage of social policies. In one such case he pointed out that “an 
important Brazilian newspaper” had headlined a story covering a government program sub-
sidizing construction materials for poorer people as follows: “Lula faveliza o Brasil.” From this 
                                                 
31  In 2002 Lula appointed the renowned political marketing guru Duda Mendonça. 
32  The confrontation peaked after a New York Times correspondent wrote that Brazilians were concerned about 
Lula’s proclivity to alcohol abuse. In addition to an impulsive deportation decision, the government reacted by 
announcing a bill aiming to institute a journalistic board to regulate the profession. This “declaration of war” 
ended in appeasement after the entire news media reacted en masse against this “attack on press freedom.” 
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headline he inferred that it was written from the perspective of someone “who has not the 
slightest notion of what it means for the poorer people […] to be able to build their own 
houses.” Another case he frequently cites concerns the elite press’s references to the Bolsa 
Família Program as “assistentialism” or “clientelism.” This example comes from a resonant 
and insightful 2008 magazine interview dedicated exclusively to the president’s views on the 
media and the press.33 In the interview, which took place at the peak of his popularity, Lula 
declared his indifference to this media’s ideological character, which he deemed to be part of 
the “historical behavior” of the Brazilian press. This character, he reasoned, remained un-
problematic at the time given that these biased narratives were ineffective in terms of their 
impact on audiences and readers, since the latter were “intelligent” and able to discern what 
went beyond factuality. He related this idea of a nonpassive public to present-day media dif-
ferentiation, which multiplies interpretive capacities. Lula presented himself as having 
learned about the media’s nature after long, bitter experience, seeing it as something a gov-
ernment had to live with. As discussed below, this pretended indifference at the top and con-
fidence in the reception of media messages at the base level is related to active critical com-
munication on the part of the government. 
Lula has also utilized the practice of regular presidential broadcasting. Café com o Presi-
dente started in 2003 as a six-minute long nationwide radio talk aired twice a month (since 
2005 it has aired weekly). In his performances, the president empathizes with the common 
people regarding their problems, enounces government policy, and interviews popular fig-
ures (Trein 2008). Despite the relatively small direct audience, this speech platform remains 
central to the government’s agenda-setting efforts since news agencies and the press, given 
the scarcity of other sources, quote from it extensively. Extensive presidential touring is also 
intended to produce controlled events that have an impact on the noncontrolled media. At 
the same time, the government keeps all journalists, regardless of their rank and prestige, 
equally uncertain about who will get access to the source, instead of relying continually on 
certain journalists as outlets for government messages (Scolese and Nossa 2006). 
During Lula’s 2006 reelection campaign, the use of capillary tactics to counteract big me-
dia coverage multiplied. Numerous NGOs linked to the PT organized viewings of Citizen 
Cane in poor suburban neighborhoods. These showings were followed by debates which 
aimed to draw parallels to the Brazilian media. Meanwhile, the role of deconstructing media 
coverage was assumed by a number of pro-Lula Internet activists who ran websites known 
as “watchblogs” (De Lima 2007, Malini 2007). 
When he began his second term, Lula announced the creation of a federal public televi-
sion station. Until then public television had only existed at the state level. He defended the 
project on the basis of the need to counterbalance market logic and to promote debates that 
commercial television was not interested in. By the end of 2007 the Empresa Brasil de Comu-
                                                 
33  Interview with Piauí magazine, December 2008, online: <www.info.planalto.gov.br/exec/inf_entrevistasdata.cfm> 
(20 April 2010). 
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nicação had been created. In order to rebut press critiques regarding the station’s dependence 
on the Ministry of Communications, an advisory board of independent personalities was ap-
pointed and renowned journalists and anchors were hired. However, the resignation of one 
of the journalists and one of the board members shortly thereafter on grounds of interference 
led to renewed and loud criticism on the part of the press. 
Private media regulation has been limited in Brazil. Although petistas and other leftist al-
lies shared such an agenda, Lula’s path to Brasilia was paved by tactical settlements with the 
media, especially with the Globo Group (Kotscho 2006, Miguel 2006). Regulatory initiatives 
have faced obstacles stemming from big media—highly influential in terms of public opin-
ion—and its interests, which are intertwined in complex ways with political interests nested 
in parliament, an arena where government needs to forge alliances to achieve majorities.34 
Nevertheless, since 2003 Congress has discussed several proposed bills which would regu-
late media industries. These have been met with stiff political and business community op-
position (Lins da Silva 2009). In contrast to regulatory efforts in areas such as public televi-
sion and production quota policies, where the government has found allies and room to ma-
neuver,35 in private sector regulation the PT has faced an impasse. This limitation has col-
lided with the demands of, and frustrated, the party’s core constituencies. In late 2009 the 
government tried to contain the resulting internal pressure by organizing a Federal Confer-
ence of Communications (Confecom) intended to generate consensus on media democratiza-
tion issues. The results of these debates were to be the basis for a new general legislation that 
the government promised to promote in Congress. However, a last minute defection by most 
of the big media representatives has made the initiative’s success doubtful, especially given 
that it is an election year. 
Brazil also deviates from the expectations of progressive groups regarding community me-
dia policy. Indeed, considering the previous status quo in the country, Brazil exhibits the worst 
performance of the leftist Latin American governments. Compared to its predecessor, Lula’s 
government has, according to critics, caused the increased criminalization of community broad-
casters while slowing down the pace of operator authorizations. The government has also been 
accused of conferring media licenses intended for genuine civil society groups to local political 
bosses (AMARC 2009: 140-1). Again, the government’s compromises with established powers 
seem to explain the shift in its practices. Its initial alliances with the Movimento dos Trabalha-
dores Rurais Sem Terra’s (MST) landless peasants, with ecological groups, and with other social 
movements have shifted towards more pragmatic electoral and parliamentary alliances with 
traditional local political leaders as it has attempted to maintain its ability to govern. 
                                                 
34  Not only do media industries have strong lobbies in political arenas, but politicians themselves also own approxi-
mately 25 percent of the television channels, mostly regional stations, that retransmit big-media programming. 
35  New legislation stipulates national production quotas. Brazilian cultural nationalism, though, is not an exclusive 
feature of the left. Moreover, the Globo Group, the biggest media-content industry, has backed these initiatives. 
Kitzberger: The Media Activism of Latin America’s Leftist Governments 29 
Though Tabaré Vázquez and other members of the cabinet in Uruguay’s leftist government 
periodically confront the media, their public criticism is generally the standard nonideologi-
cal repertoire of complaints: accusations of being oppositional or overemphasizing “bad 
news.” However, as is the case with the PT, the constitutive party organizations of the gov-
erning Frente Amplio (FA) share a set of critical ideas about media and communication; these 
ideas are “heir to a Latin American leftist tradition” (Moreira and Vincent 2010). In its policy 
programs, the coalition stresses the excessive concentration and discourse dominance of the 
commercially oriented media, and the need for the democratization of voice through the fos-
tering of public and community media. 
Although practices such as regular broadcasting have not been used in Uruguay, presi-
dential communication is usually limited to speeches and press releases. Indeed, Vázquez 
generally avoids interviews, press conferences, or other forms of regular contact with the 
press (Vincent and Moreira 2010). On the other hand, the coalition parties’ strong base-level 
organizations have provided channels for decentralized criticism of big media, especially 
during elections. 
Uruguay’s leftist government has neither innovated in the realm of state media nor chal-
lenged the private media’s dominance. During its first term, the FA government seems, like 
its Brazilian counterpart, to have felt constrained. Though it had historically denounced col-
lusion between big broadcasters and traditional parties, once in power and after some 
clashes, it accommodated the media by not touching the interests of the television-owner 
families in exchange for not-too-aggressive coverage (Moreira and Vincent 2010). It was in 
the domain of alternative media that the government instead advanced its progressive 
agenda. In 2006 Uruguay sanctioned the Community Radio Service Law, which significantly 
enhanced the standing of community operators (AMARC 2009). 
Overt media-critical discourse appears to have been almost absent on the part of the recent 
leftist Chilean governments. Only occasionally did socialist president Bachelet allude to 
newscasts’ overemphasis on crime or their gender biases as serving rightist agendas. Chile 
seems to be the clearest counterpoint to Venezuela when one considers how governments 
have gone public with criticism of the media. A brief example depicts this well: In 2005, a 
front-page article in the conservative and influential El Mercurio denounced governmental 
nepotism and corruption. Socialist president Ricardo Lagos reacted by writing a letter to 
Agustín Edwards, the editor, in which he plainly accused the newspaper of having anti-
democratic intentions. Significantly, it was a private letter and was not intended for publica-
tion. Nevertheless, and also significantly, it was the newspaper’s editor who sought public 
confrontation by publishing the letter. Chile also contrasts with Brazil and Uruguay in that 
the media discourse at the governmental party or coalition level relies on standard liberal-
democratic conceptions of the media. To the Concertacionista elites democratization has bene-
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fited from the depoliticization of public opinion, which has been reinforced by the deregu-
lated media market.36 
Chile’s leftist governments have not challenged the existing public-private balance in the 
media landscape. The inherited neoliberal regulatory scheme, which has framed the media 
purely in terms of market activity, has not been challenged by the Concertación (Lugo 
Ocando 2008). To critics on the left, the only politics in the media realm has been “no poli-
tics” (Herrera Campos 2007). This inability to challenge the media landscape has also been 
reflected in the realm of community media. The neglect of these institutions has only recently 
started to be reversed with a new law that merely softens the state’s formerly repressive ap-
proach to them. For broadcaster organizations, this “improvement” just puts the worst Latin 
American legislation on community radio (Chile) on par with the second worst (Brazil) 
(AMARC 2009: 161). In sum, if Venezuela lies at one extreme of a continuum that represents 
the degree of institutional constraints, Chile lies at the opposite extreme. The Chilean social-
ists’ path to government has been one of submission to post-authoritarian institutional rules 
and compromise with established political and social actors. 
4. Conclusion: The Media Activism of Latin America’s Leftist Governments in Context 
The commercialization of media systems and the diffusion of US-inspired professional ide-
ology in journalism have resulted in increased distance between politics and newsrooms 
around the world. As a consequence of this distance, media coverage of governments has be-
come increasingly critical and hostile. Simultaneously, governments have come to feel in-
creasingly dependent on positive media portrayals in order to mobilize public opinion, 
mainly due to the decline of party-political identities (Hallin and Mancini 2004, Helms 2008). 
This new context, where media appear to affect the political process with their own logic, 
seems to have engendered a worldwide increase in governmental media activities. Following 
the American example, which has long had a public relations-centered presidency, executives 
make efforts to counteract contemporary news media outlets’ self-portrayal as the watchdogs 
of state affairs on behalf of society. This counteroffensive in the public sphere can be seen, for 
example, in the growth of new professional roles and task forces related to public communi-
cation and media relations within governments; it can also be seen in the routinization of ra-
tionalized media-relations practices that, through expertise, anticipate journalists’ institu-
tional needs so as to mesh with media outlets’ news agendas and generate news coverage 
(Gaber 2000, Negrine et al. 2007). 
                                                 
36  Significantly, former left-wing intellectuals who served as media advisors to the Concertación have converted 
to mainstream liberalism. In their view, the modernization of the media system, triggered by Pinochet’s struc-
tural reforms, was key to democratic consolidation given the prevalence of a moderating market logic over po-
litical or ideological impulses (Tironi and Sunkel 1993). 
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To what extent do these trends explain the media activism of Latin America’s leftist gov-
ernments? Though some traditional features of politics–media relationships remain, politicians 
are faced with an increasingly assertive and autonomous news media (Waisbord 2000, Hughes 
2006). The perception of media outlets as influential and politically decisive institutions has 
grown dramatically among political elites in the region. According to Ruiz (2010), this (mis-) 
conception of media power explains the general trend of governments developing aggressive 
strategies against media-colonized politics. In his view, the overstated perception of media 
power originates in the distinctive timing of political and media change in Latin America: de-
mocratization coincided with a dramatic media revolution. During the lost decade of the 1980s 
and the neoliberal 1990s, the media kept expanding their influence while political actors con-
tinually lost public favor. According to this perspective, it is the particular timing of these two 
contrasting changes, not ideology, that explains the exaggerated governmental responses to the 
media. This account may explain the intensity of governmental responses, but, while not incor-
rect, it misses the qualitative distinctiveness of the cases described in this paper. 
Government executives oriented to Western PR practices do not—though they undoubt-
edly might wish to (Cook 1998: 83-4)—bypass journalism in their public communications. 
Latin American leftist governments’ practices of systematically bypassing journalism 
through direct communication and “trench wars” question the liberal assumptions (neutral-
ity, watchdog role, etc.) that underlie journalism. This type of questioning is built into a par-
ticular ideological interpretative scheme. However, critics have generally ascribed this ques-
tioning to extra-ideological factors. Media confrontation and direct communication have 
been linked to populist resurgence. Defined as political interpellations where leaders present 
themselves as the true expression of the people, populist appeals can be framed according to 
leftist or rightist worldviews (Waisbord 2003). For empirical proof of this contention, observ-
ers point to the analogous direct-communication practices and televised narratives under-
taken by leftist Hugo Chávez and rightist Álvaro Uribe (Rincón 2008). 
Populist appeals claim to represent the people as a whole, without mediation. The popu-
list standpoint is always dualistic. It is a narrative of the people as opposed and oppressed by 
an enemy: a minority of the privileged, an oligarchy. This fact leaves no room for the liberal 
understanding of the role of the press. A press that releases a discordant voice can’t be any-
thing but the expression of that oligarchy, or whatever rhetorical figure is used as the enemy 
of the people. This understanding of politics places the press in a partisan role incompatible 
with liberal assumptions. Moreover, when the populists question the worldview offered by 
the contemporary media, they deny—and thereby dispute—the latter’s claim to represent so-
ciety. Indeed, present-day populists clash with the media given the fact that present-day me-
dia, in their commercially oriented attempts to maximize their audience, also exert a sort of 
populist appeal (Waisbord 2003). 
According to this view of the relationship between populism and the media, the practice of 
pointing at the illusory character of media “independence” and unveiling the interests behind 
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the media is an attribute of populism rather than leftism. But while populism may explain the 
anti-political and anti-establishment features of ideologically diverse discourses, focusing 
solely on populism fails to illuminate some of the other traits of the country cases described 
above. Populism may explain presidents’ centralized direct-communication strategies, but it 
does not account for the simultaneous capillary practice of subverting big media messages at 
the base level. The decentralized capillary practices depend on the existence of militants, ad-
herents, enthusiast youngsters, or bloggers who identify with a cause driven by a leftist iden-
tity, not simply by populist appeals. Neither does populism provide a plausible explanation of 
market-alternative media policies. These are founded on leftist ideas about the media’s role in 
democratic societies. These last two ideas point to a particular characteristic of the new Latin 
American left: its discomfort with and its challenging of the new media landscapes dominated 
by big business.37 This ideological galvanization, which has permeated government agendas 
where the left has come to power, may be explained by a factor already mentioned above: the 
media’s dramatic expansion coincided with the neoliberal wave in Latin America. Conse-
quently, it has been easy for politicians to associate big media with neoliberalism. Given the 
cohesive role of anti-neoliberalism and its importance in the resurgence of the left’s popularity 
after the pro-market orthodoxy failed to meet public expectations, the antagonism between the 
media and leftist governments in Latin America is hardly surprising. 
Anti-neoliberalism has revitalized a leftist core of critical ideas about press and media 
that have permeated government personnel and coalitions. These ideas constitute a blend of 
views with diverse origins. In part, critical portrayals of the liberal press stemming from 
former leftist, reformist, or populist national experiences seem to have reemerged, as in the 
case of Argentina’s leftist Peronist culture. At the same time, a region-wide intellectual tradi-
tion of critical communication from the 1960s and 1970s—inspired by the so-called NOMIC 
(New World Order for Information and Communication), an agenda derived from the 1980 
UNESCO-sponsored McBride report criticizing informational and access inequalities that fa-
vored developed countries—has also reemerged. These revived traditions have mixed with 
more recent media critiques linked to new internationalist grassroots perspectives that are 
circulating in region-wide alternative publications, forums, and activist networks38 (Sel 2009: 
24-29). Aram Aharonian, the veteran Uruguayan journalist who conceived of the Telesur pro-
ject, best exemplifies the presence of this vision within the personnel and policies of the vari-
ous governments. To him, the station’s slogan, “Our North is the South,” expresses the criti-
cal-communication tradition’s message of fighting the North’s informational hegemony. As 
                                                 
37  In contrast to Europe, where public media exist as a counterbalancing force, commercial logics have dominated 
Latin America’s media landscapes since neoliberal deregulation. This contrast may account for the respective re-
sponses of the leftist camps on each continent. 
38  The Porto Alegre Forum and the Spanish editions of Le Monde Diplomatique are two prominent examples where 
the critical views of figures such as Noam Chomsky and Ignacio Ramonet, the latter’s general editor and a global 
media activist, are disseminated. 
Kitzberger: The Media Activism of Latin America’s Leftist Governments 33 
chairman of the station he was completely devoted, sometimes even against the will of the 
Venezuelan administration, to creating an alternative to CNN and to the media portrayals 
that reflected “us through the eyes of others”39 (Kozloff 2006: 125). 
In addition to (or even reinforcing) ideological tradition, there is some evidence to sug-
gest that the “Chavista experience” has also exerted some weight as a meaningful example of 
alternative media practices for the leftist governments that came to power after it.40 The dif-
fusion of the Venezuelan practices—which is due to new media technologies and interna-
tional media coverage, both of which have made the country’s experiences more visible to its 
neighbors—may have turned into a reciprocal feedback loop facilitating mutual learning. On 
the other hand, this diffusion has not functioned through imitation alone. Indeed, the Boli-
varian government has had an active policy of spreading alternative media discourses and 
practices in Latin America, as the examples of Telesur and Venezuela’s logistical and financial 
support for alternative media illustrate. 
In sum, this paper has presented the picture of a novel governmental media activism on 
the part of leftist governments in Latin America—a picture emerging from a properly articu-
lated view of both their communication practices and their media policies. This activism, as 
we have seen, is not independent from the revitalization of media-critical leftist perspectives 
in Latin American civil society. The extent to which these governments’ leftist agendas are 
ideologically sincere or merely the opportunistic instrumentalization of such moods in soci-
ety is a question that worries both the governments’ foes and some of the social movements 
engaged in media reform. It is also a question which this article cannot answer. Yet whatever 
the answer, it does not affect the phenomenon of Latin American governments’ leftist media 
activism itself. 
                                                 
39  In an article published on the Spanish leftist website rebelión.org, Aharonian explicitly roots Telesur in the critical 
traditions mentioned above, online: <www.rebelion.org/noticias/2006/8/36669.pdf> (April 2010). 
40  A former press advisor to the Kirchners emphasized in a 2008 interview with this paper’s author that both believe 
that lessons have to be learned from developments in the relationship between government and media in Venezuela. 
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